Sidney Rittenberg

Interesting video interview from the Economist with Sidney Rittenberg, an American who lived in China from 1944 to 1979. He’s had a fascinating life — he spent time with the early Communist party in Yan’an, but was then accused by Stalin of being an American spy, and was put in solitary confinement for six years. He was eventually released, but after an active role in the Cultural Revolution, he was put back in prison and spent another ten years behind bars. In the interview he is asked why he didn’t leave China after being released from his first stay in prison, and he responds that rather than turning against Marxism, he assumed that he had been imprisoned because he hadn’t been revolutionary enough and he determined to try even harder to be a loyal Communist. But he has changed his ideology along with China, and now he makes money advising multinational corporations that want to do business in China.

Among the many topics touched on in the interview, he talks about the change he saw in Mao before and after the Communist Party’s rise to power. According to Rittenberg, when he talked to Mao in Yan’an (before the Communist Party had taken power), Mao would listen intently to what he said, and the party as a whole, dependent on popular support, did its best to deserve that support. After he had taken power, Mao was someone who was listened to, not someone who listened — corrupted by absolute power.

Communist kitsch

Quite catchy, in a Communist kitsch sort of way. The video, posted on tudou (via ChinaSMACK), has been doing the rounds of Chinese internet forums, and although people commenting on it have speculated that it will get “harmonized”, it hasn’t been taken down quite yet.

As any tourist who has travelled through China knows, Communist kitsch is everywhere. Like many before me, my first trip to China saw me bring home torn replicas of Communist-era propaganda posters, and a very cool lighter in the shape of Mao’s little red book. I had taken classes on Chinese history, both old and modern, and so I was fully aware of the events in the past few decades in China, but when I put the poster on the wall of my college dorm room, it didn’t occur to me that anyone might take offence — until my Chinese American roommate made a comment about the millions of people who died under Mao. I decided to take the poster down.

A lot of people do have these posters on their walls, and I’ve had discussions with friends on the question of why (in general) it’s ok for a Western hipster to have a purely ironic poster of Chairman Mao on the wall, when a poster of Hitler, or Pol Pot, would feel completely inappropriate. A video like the one above is obviously playing with the memory of the Maoist propaganda machine in a way that is healthy, and probably not entirely without effect, given that the assumption among Chinese web users is that the government will see the video  as mocking the Communist legacy, of which it is the heir, and will block it. A part of the nature of humor is to test the limits of what is politically and socially acceptable. But other forms of Communist  memorabilia aren’t explicitly funny, or ironic, but are still popular.

A part of it has to do with what these symbols convey. A symbol only has the meaning that those who communicate through that symbol assign to it. A swatstika continues to carry the meaning, at least to some degree, that its bearer supports Nazism, while being a Maoist is for young people today such a remote possibility that Chinese communist kitsch is assumed to be just kitsch. It’s also obviously possible to evoke certain aspects of history without endorsing everything about that time period (when Americans deify their Founding Fathers, for example, that doesn’t mean they think slavery was ok).

At the same time, China’s own relationship with its past is complicated, and a Mao poster in a rural home in China is likely to be a genuine expression of reverence for the Great Helmsman. The modern state is very much the direct successor to the Communist regime responsible for the suffering of millions under Mao, and there has been no public reckoning or break with the Great Leap Forward or the Cultural Revolution. Anything related to the Tiananmen Square protests is censored, and if published online, will quickly get harmonized. For lots of people in China — especially the older generations, and people in the countryside – the Mao souvenirs aren’t kitsch, they’re real. And for lots of people with Chinese heritage in the West, the painful memories of starvation and persecution are what first come to mind when they see these symbols.

And so for people who believe that Mao was more than 30% wrong, having a Mao poster on the wall should probably be treated in the same way as displaying symbols representing other controversial figures — fine if you’re sure what message those seeing the symbol will interpret from it, and you’re comfortable with conveying that message, but to be treated with caution when there’s a risk of causing unintentional offence. In other words, fewer Mao posters on the wall, and more videos like the one above.

Alcohol in China

The Economist reports that China is the world’s biggest beer market, and that drinking is growing by 10% per year, although with very thin margins for producers. Which reminded of this story on Pabst Blue Ribbon Beer, a new and extremely up-market beer being launched in China (I found the story via Evan Osnos’s New Yorker blog, where he writes more about it here and here). It’s selling for 300 rmb per bottle (US$44 / £28), a little bit more expensive than the 2 rmb bottles of Snow beer we used to drink in Wuhan. But then again, it’s probably meant for classier accompaniments than shaokao.

According to the brewmaster, there’s a market for upscale beer:

There’s the nouveau riche, and in China, perception is everything—look at me, I’m rich. Then also, there is another group that may be part of our market, and that’s state banquet dinners. Normally, you’d drink brandy, and this beer kind of has the look of brandy—it’s a reddish-brown color, but it won’t hurt you as much.

Osnos also wrote a few weeks ago about the effect of Chinese rich consumers on the wine market, seen in particular in the exorbitant prices for Carruades de Lafite, the second (and lower-quality) label from the premium Bordeaux wine estate. Rich Chinese consumers buy the wine in huge quantities because they associate the brand with the vineyard’s prestigious (and even more expensive) first growth wine, and because a widely-recognized expensive foreign wine is useful for guanxi purposes. The article Osnos links to is worth reading for the full story on the phenomenon (written by Andy Xie — 谢国忠 — a prominent Chinese economist). And for anyone with a New Yorker subscription, Osnos’ article on the St. Pierres, who essentially created the imported wine industry in modern China, is also worth reading.

Netizens of China, Unite!

The Chinese online world, a huge mob of “netizens,” is a powerful force, as has been pointed out many times before. They expose corruption scandals and force politicians to put hot topics on the agenda. They skirt censorship and discuss topics that other forms of media would never dare to mention (and the government’s own 5 mao army struggles in its attempts to steer the debate). They introduce new words, and even re-introduce new characters, into the language. They’re used by PR companies for huge viral campaigns. When they turn against someone, they organize a “human flesh search,” and that person’s entire life and personal details are posted online, in an act of complete public humiliation.

They can sometimes be scary, but they can also be a force for good. In this interview with Evan Osnos, who writes for the New Yorker from Beijing, Osnos talks about how his New Yorker pieces about China get translated more or less spontaneously as soon as they hit the press, by volunteers who coordinate themselves and post the translated work online. New Yorker pieces tend to be long — often up to 10,000 words — and according to Osnos, the translations are faithful to the original, an impressive feat. He also says in the interview that the entire weekly issue of the Economist magazine gets translated within a few days of publication and is posted online.

A few days ago, I discovered that a Reuters article about “ant people”, in which I was cited, had gone through the same process. Google my name, and you’ll find that a translated version of the article is everywhere, both on and off the mainland (in both traditional and simplified characters). I was interviewed for the article because I had written about the topic on my blog. I’m hardly an expert on the topic, but I had followed some of the news stories in Chinese media, and so I talked to the reporter about what I had read. I was actually misquoted in the article — the reporter asked me about living conditions, and I told him that reports from Beijing talked about 8-10 people sharing a room far outside of the city center, while the reports in Wuhan only talked about 2-3 people per room in several areas in Wuhan, including the area I lived in. In the article, I was instead cited as saying that Wuhan having 8-10 people sharing a room. By the time I had seen the article, it had already been republished across the world. And with that simple misunderstanding, this new “fact” went onto the internet, and quickly spread, attributed as first-hand evidence coming from me, on dozens of web pages. There was also a typo in the spelling of my name the second time it was written out, which some translations fixed and others decided to keep, staying as faithful to the original article as possible.

Mobs are powerful, but also notoriously difficult to control, and so it’s hard to say what the implications for all of this are for the people who want to use “netizens” for their own gain. Political commentators obviously hope that these “netizens” will push for increased openness and democratization, but the mob is just as likely to turn ugly in an outpouring of nationalism. Either way, there are a lot of people in China spending a lot of time online, and they’re a group to keep an eye on.

The Beijing Consensus

The Economist is this week hosting a debate on the “Chinese development model”, nicknamed “the Beijing Consensus”. The premise is nothing new: supporters argue that autocratic rule in China has brought 30 years of impressive growth, and that its strong grip on power has allowed to Communist Party to respond swiftly to crises such as the 2008 financial crisis and global warming. Critics, on the other hand, remind us that we all thought the same thing about Japan in the 1980s, and just look how that turned out (I was only a few years old in the 80s, but intelligent people back then apparently thought Japan would be the next big superpower and the model to emulate, only to see Japan’s economy slide into a long period of stagnation in the 90s).

The Chinese economy won’t continue to grow by 8-10% per year forever. The amount of growth in the past 30 years has been incredible, but a lot of that was bound to happen once the ridiculous economic policies of the Communist era were reversed and the Chinese people were allowed to be their naturally entrepreneurial and hard-working selves. Today, too much GDP growth comes from real estate, which is probably in a bubble (it’s enough to travel around China and see all of the empty high-rises to know that something is wrong), expensive infrastructure investment (like high-speed trains) with questionable returns, and the financial sector, with lots of money going into the pockets of people with the right connections. I see the Communist Party less as a master puppeteer pulling all the right strings, and more as a huge, complicated web of a bureaucracy desperately trying to cling on to power, with different factions trying to carve out as much of the pie for themselves before the whole thing collapses.

If China does go the way of Japan, it wouldn’t be a bad outcome — a comfortable standard of living, and given its huge population, China only needs a per capita GDP of roughly a fourth of that of the US in order to become the world’s biggest economy. And both Chinese and Western media have in the past few months been awash with stories on the recent rises in worker’s wages, signalling the first step in a shift in the economy (although a part of the rise in wages was really just an adjustment for the lack of rise with inflation during 2008 and 2009, while factories braced themselves for a downturn in international demand). Higher wages are good for everyone, both the workers with more money in their pockets, and the Chinese and foreign companies that want to sell their products to China’s growing middle class. Factories are also beginning to move from rich coastal cities like Shenzhen to more affordable inland cities, like Wuhan, spreading jobs and money more evenly across the country. (On a side-note, for a great account of life as a migrant worker in a factory town, see Leslie Chang’s book Factory Girls).

But despite these steps forward, I’m worried about the current system. I want China to succeed — not only because I like China (and I’ve just invested two years of my life into learning Chinese), but also because China accounts for a sixth of the world’s population, and bringing this huge population out of poverty and into a happy, stable existence would be a huge step forward for humanity. For that to happen, I believe economic reform will have to be accompanied by political reform.

The important thing about democracy isn’t elections per se (although elections are probably an important component of ensuring accountabilty in a political system). Rather, it’s the security provided by guaranteed rights and civil liberties that matters. If you’re never sure whether you’ll be given a fair hearing in court when a developer with ties to the government wants to take your land, you’re much less likely to make investments. If the media isn’t allowed to reveal that an executive in a state-owned company has been taking bribes, it’s much harder to fight corruption. Rich Chinese are moving abroad because living in China is just too risky, and everyone is focused on short-term profits rather than long-term investments, because it’s just to hard too tell what the long-term will bring. The small benefits that might be gained from autocratic rule don’t come close to compensating for the huge disadvantages, ranging from distorted markets and a level of risk that discourages long-term investment, to the lack of security that comes from not being able to depend on basic civil rights, driving rich and talented Chinese people out of the country.

My impression, however anecdotal, is also that more Chinese people are unhappy with the current state of affairs than outsiders realize from media reports. The problem is that young people who care don’t always know what to do or how to get in involved. The obvious choices — like joining a political party, or writing about your opinion, are off-limits, and the burden of being an only child with the responsibility of eventually providing for parents and two sets of grandparents means that most people have no choice but to focus on their careers. There’s a lot of nationalism among the post-80s and post-90s generations, which disguises discontent in the short term, but doesn’t necessarily mean that the system is working and people are happy.

The idea of the “Asian model”, that Asian cultures value hierarchy and prefer paternalistic and autocratic leadership, is one that I find ridiculous. The American-style presidential system might not be the answer everywhere, but no one wants to be put in jail for trying to protect local wildlife, and I don’t believe restricting basic civil liberties is necessary for or conducive to economic growth.

Shanghai Expo

Here comes the last round of pictures from the trip around China, this time from the Expo in Shanghai. The Expo has widely been seen as the second part in China’s two-year coming-out party to the world — the first part being the Olympics in Beijing — and one of the theme songs for the Expo was titled “The world watches China”.

The world does watch China — investors look at the growth of the economy, business looks at the rise in domestic consumption, governments watch its growing political power, and the rest of us watch as more than a billion people are slowly lifted out of poverty. But the Expo probably isn’t the best example of the world watching China — rather, it was the rest of the world hoping that China would have a look at us. Countries and corporations paid huge amounts of money to build extravagant Expo pavilions, all in the name of promoting trade, introducing new products to the huge numbers of Chinese consumers and potential business contacts who have already visited the Expo, or simply just improving — or creating — a brand image for that country in China.

Some countries, like the US, didn’t need the Expo to build on its brand image, and built the most basic pavilion that saving political face would allow (and even though it was, according to reports, nothing special, the line to enter was still more than three hours long when we there). Smaller and less wealthy countries either contributed with a tiny stall in one of the larger buildings, or went for something simple — like Cuba, which essentially set up a large box with a bar selling Cuba Libres, Mojitos and Daquiris, a backdrop of Havana painted on the wall, and salsa music playing in the background. North Korea’s pavilion was also essentially a simple box, with replicas of a small bridge and water fountain, the text “Paradise for People” on the wall, and a small bookshop selling the collected works of Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il.

But many countries had gone all-out. One of the longest lines was more than four hours and was for the Saudi Arabian pavilion, a huge structure complete with an IMAX theatre inside. Japan and South Korea also had huge pavilions with huge lines. Our first stop was the Swedish pavilion, which had a (moderate) wait of one hour to get in. The focus was very much on Swedish industry and how it can be of benefit to China — which seemed like a good use of the huge investment that goes into this sort of event. Larger countries that had the funds and placed a high priority on building closer economic ties with China took the investment very seriously.

Each pavilion tried to out-do the others in terms of creativity. One of my favorites was the Spanish pavilion, which we didn’t have time to visit, but is apparently bringing in a chef from a different region of Spain for each week of the Expo, and the chefs together have a total of 49 Michelin stars. Many Westerners associate “Chinese” food with the small selection available in Chinese restaurants in the West, and don’t necessarily realize what an incredible diversity of cuisines there are in different regions in China. The same goes for Chinese perceptions of “Western” food, and given that for many people outside of the Beijing and Shanghai, Pizza Hut and McDonalds essentially represent Western food, I’m glad that Spain has used the Expo as an opportunity to introduce the rich variety of Spanish food to its visitors.

The highlight, of course, was the amazing architecture, and that alone made the Expo worth visiting. Unfortunately everyone else in Shanghai felt the same way (and everyone working for a state-owned company was sent on a company field trip to keep the visitor numbers high), and so the lines are ridiculously long. But all in all, it was still very much worth the visit, and whether the Expo really was “the world watching China”, at the very least it was another step on the path to closer ties.

Chinese pavilion

By the entrance

A Dala Horse in front of the Swedish pavilion

The somewhat surreal seed-themed British pavilion

Back to Wuhan

The way back home from Tibet went via my adopted home, Wuhan, to say goodbye to friends and pick up our overstuffed suitcases. I spent my days in a whirlwind of good-bye dinners, lunches and coffees, each one making it more and more difficult to leave. One friend even made a home-cooked dinner, quite an honor in a country where meeting friends almost always happens at restaurants. The weather was mostly nice, and the summer heat hadn’t yet set in — a perfect time to return to, and leave, Wuhan.

I left Wuhan in June, and in the month and a half since I left, a lot has happened there. One friend got married (these things can happen quickly). The Wuda campus was flooded with water. See below for pictures, via Eric, who since I left has started a company to connect people to teaching and business opportunities in China (a good person to talk to if you want to teach in Wuhan).

The most shocking piece of news was one that I discovered via the Washington Post. The director of the Women’s Health Center in Wuhan, which I wrote about a few months ago (here and here), was arrested, and according to the Washington Post, is currently in detention — I’m hoping to hear how she’s doing soon.


Hiking in the Himalayas

Another long-overdue round of pictures. The highlight of the trip to Tibet was a three-and-a-half-day hike from a point near Ganden monastary, through the mountains, over two passes (the highest of which was at 5100 m), and eventually ending at a point near Samye monastery. Our group of five was led by a guide, a cook, three yak-herders and ten yaks. The yaks carried our bags, tents and food, and moved twice as fast as we did. And were also very cute.

The hike was pretty intense — I thought that after doing a few short hikes in other parts of China and wearing a pair of brand-new hiking boots bought in Beijing, 5-6 hours of hiking per day would be manageable. I was wrong — the first day was relaxed, but the second day, which had us at the highest altitudes, was exhausting, and by the end of the day I needed oxygen to recoup after Martin and I staggered into camp with hail raining down on us (I was clearly the slowest in the group). By day three we were descending, and there was more oxygen in the air, but also vampire bears in the woods — they kill children, and suck blood from adults — so we kept up the pace and then stayed closed together once we had struck camp. I later realized, seeing the pictures from the afternoon, that we were all extremely swollen at that point — I looked like I had gained 10 kgs — and I’m not sure if it was because of the altitude, or because of the salt water we were drinking to stay hydrated, but either way it was all very extreme. But also incredibly beautiful — and by Day 4, we had left the stark rocky landscapes and snow-capped mountains, descending into green fields and flowers. The yaks, and even more impressively, the yak-herders, turned around to do the journey back, up-mountain, in a day and a half, as we were bussed onwards to Samye monastery and then home to the luxury of our hotel.

We had a wonderful experience overall, and our tour guide was amazing — if anyone reading this is planning a trip to Tibet, send me an email and I’ll pass along their contact information.

A Tibetan mastiff that would eat me if it wasn't tied firmly to its pole

Yak dung drying on a wall

The puppy version is friendlier

A nomad family's tent, this one without solar panels

Martin, looking cool

Tony, looking cool

Snow-capped pass

Chris, looking cool

Beautiful views

A nomad family gave us surprisingly delicious salt tea, and now have my walking stick

Frosty morning views

More beautiful views

Flowers

Martin, looking handsome

Yak

Prayer flags in the wind

Tibet

As loyal readers of my blog have probably noticed, I’m a bit behind on updates from the trip. The last two weeks of the trip were a whirlwind of experiences, and the first three weeks at home were a whirlwind of reunions, so it’s not until now that I’ve been able to sit down and write. And given how controversial the issue of Tibet’s political status is, both in China and abroad, I wanted to take some time to reflect before writing about my own impressions.

Travelling to Tibet

For a foreigner, even just getting to Tibet at all was cumbersome. In addition to a Chinese visa, foreigners need a travel permit to visit Lhasa, and another permit to visit other parts of Tibet, which both require a local travel agency and the accompaniment of a guide at all times. The government wants tourists (who bring in money), but doesn’t want journalists and activists (who bring trouble), and so the travel agencies are put in charge of issuing permits, and are responsible for the behaviour of their charges while they’re in Tibet. Some people find ways around the rules or sneak across the border (which is very difficult and dangerous to do), and wandering around Lhasa on your own is fine, but most people don’t want to get their local guide in trouble, and therefore stay on their best behaviour.

And so the Tibet that a tourist sees is a tightly controlled version of reality. We walked in and out of the old streets of central Lhasa, where old men and women walk clockwise around temples in prayer and the markets and shops are filled with pilgrims and tourists. We took pictures of the buildings and the people, but were strictly instructed not to photograph the soldiers — difficult to avoid, since they were everywhere. The military uniforms with huge guns and full body armour felt excessive in a place filled with religious pilgrims, and sharpshooters on the rooftops of temples and mosques seemed mildly inappropriate, but on the whole people seemed to get on with their lives, and the soldiers just mixed in with all of the rest of the colors and sounds of the market.

I had read a few books on Tibet before coming, and I knew that at least some people were sad that the Dalai Lama couldn’t return to Tibet, or frustrated that the new railway meant an influx of immigrants from Sichuan and fiercer competition for jobs. But I can’t remember anyone we talked to expressing any kind of anger or frustration. Our guide was very friendly and extremely professional. He answered every question we asked him, but never with any hint that he was unhappy about Tibet’s situation. Which makes sense — even if he did have other opinions, why vent frustration to a tourist who can’t do anything about it and will leave in a few days, when informants are everywhere, and saying something negative means risking everything?

And so, other than the overwhelming presence of soldiers in the Tibetan parts of Lhasa (and lack of soldiers in the newer, Chinese parts), which to me gave a feeling of being in a place under martial law, it would on the whole have been easy to come away with the feeling that things in Tibet aren’t that different from in the rest of China — a place with restrictions on things that Westerners see as important freedoms, like speech and religion, but people work around the restrictions, and for most, everyday life feels relatively free.

Tibet in the news

For someone who wants to get a sense of what the situation in Tibet is really like, turning to newspapers and magazines doesn’t necessarily give a simple answer either. The Chinese government has been very active in promoting its narrative of Tibetan history, and at the same time discredit Western reporting on current events. An old woman on a train in Shandong province, in northeastern China, saw that I was reading a book on Tibetan history, and told me about a documentary she had seen that told the story of how Tibetans had been freed from slavery by the Communist Party, chains literally removed from around their feet, and informed its viewers that now all Tibetans were happy and well-fed. Western media is accused of reporting on the actions of a few “extremists”, falsely implying that the majority of Tibetans would prefer for Tibet to be independent when only a small group of “separatists” hold this view, and exaggerating the brutality of crack-downs against demonstrators by cropping pictures and video clips to show police beating protesters but cutting away protesters attacking the police.

The idea that critical reporting on Tibet is a part of a Western media bias against China plays well with the nationalism that’s alarmingly common, especially in people of the post-80′s generation. The fact that it’s difficult for Western journalists to travel to Tibet to research reports only increases the chance that what is reported will contain mistakes or be one-sided, and makes the reporting even easier to discredit.

A complicated history

Central to the public debate, it seems, has been the issue of whether or not Tibet is “inherently” a part of China. The Chinese side cites a long history of contacts between Tibet and China — Tibet was once an empire of its own that exchanged tributes and princesses with the Chinese empire — and then a closer relationship that began with the Qing dynasty Qianlong emperor (a practising Buddhist) in the 18th century, during which time the emperor sent in the Chinese army to prop up the Dalai Lama’s government, in return for spiritual guidance and blessings from the Dalai Lama. Tibet was invaded in 1904 by the British (who wanted to hold this key position between Russia, China and India) but they withdrew once the government back in London found out about the invasion and realized it was a stupid idea. With the fall of the Qing dynaty, Tibet then enjoyed a few decades of de facto independence before being invaded once again, this time by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army, who made it a part of the modern Communist State.

Long before the Communist Party took power, “liberating” Tibet (along with Taiwan and Hainan) was a part of the CCP’s agenda — a matter both of strategic military importance (the highlands of Tibet could serve as an entry point either for Indian or Russian armies), and as a matter of nationalist pride (the British invasion put Tibet on the list of areas loosely belonging to the Qing empire that had been invaded by imperialist forces). Later Western activism for Tibetan independence was seen as just the latest reincarnation of imperialist meddling with Chinese territory. The Chinese government often states that it freed Tibetans from what was essentially a slave society, and Tibet in the early 1900s probably was in need of serious reform, which the ruling elite at the time was too slow to deliver. But what followed under Chinese rule was certainly not better.

Tibet, like mainland China, suffered terribly during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. It’s sometimes said that in mainland China, the Great Leap Forward mainly affected the countryside, while the Cultural Revolution affected the cities, but Tibet, despite being mainly rural, most certainly suffered hugely during the Cultural Revolution, and probably felt the pain of the Great Leap Forward as well. In fact, in his book Tibet, Tibet, Patrick French cites someone who claims that the Cultural Revolution lasted for a full 20 years in Tibet, starting in 1960 and not ending until 1980.

During the reform period in 1980s, conditions in Tibet improved, and Hu Yaobang, one of the reform-minded politicians in power in the 80s, famously visited Tibet, apologized for the pain inflected on the region, and promised two-pronged reform, both political and economic. Tibetans, like many in mainland China, wanted more, and increasing demonstrations eventually convinced the leadership in Beijing that political reform had been a mistake. Since then, the strategy has instead been a “one-pronged approach”, full focus on economic reform.

Tibet today

The Chinese government has in the past two decades invested huge amounts of money in developing Tibet’s economy. There are policies in place to help Tibetans (and other minorities from poorer parts of the country), most notably extra points on the college entrance examination to make it easier for young Tibetans to get into university, and exceptions to the one-child policy. But critics say that economic development isn’t benefiting Tibetans, partly because low-level jobs go to Mandarin-speaking immigrants from other regions of China (like neighbouring Sichuan province), and higher-level jobs go to people with the right connections, who tend to be Han Chinese.

Critics of the Free Tibet movement sometimes claim that foreigners who say that they’re fighting to protect Tibetan culture really just want Tibet to remain a quaint, rural and essentially impoverished place. Change inevitably benefits some and hurts others, but for most Tibetans, economic development would probably be a good thing. The problem, in my opinion, isn’t economic development per se, but rather who gets the rewards of development (currently those with connections in government), and who pays the price (currently the environment, and local communities who depend on it). The official line seems to be that the majority of Tibetans are happy with the focus on economic development, and that the demonstrations and riots of the past few years are the work of a small number of extremists — but writers who do try to dig deeper seem to find widespread unhappiness with the lack of religious and political freedom, and frustration that the fruits of economic development for the most part don’t go to Tibetans.

Which brings us to today, and what needs to happen. To be honest, I don’t know what the answer is. The Western “Free Tibet” campaign seems to have been not only ineffective but directly counterproductive – the Chinese government’s response has been an appeal to nationalism, and it has essentially locked itself into a position that now makes any kind of negotiation with the Dalai Lama extremely difficult. But the current situation is clearly unacceptable (see hereherehere and here for coverage of some of the most recent crackdowns on Tibetans, and here and here for coverage on recent examples of the government asserting its control over the religious system in Tibet).

In my eyes, the basic problem in Tibet is the same as in the rest of China – a lack of basic political freedom that leaves local officials free to exploit their positions for personal gain without being held accountable for their actions, and silences any potential opposition from the public. To me, there doesn’t seem to be an inherent problem with Tibet being a part of China – the Chinese people I know are proud that this beautiful and culturally rich region is a part of their country, and if political rights were protected and economic rewards shared more fairly, there are potentially benefits to being a part of a quickly growing economy (in this article from ten years back, Peter Hessler, who is one of my favorite authors, points out that China has invested huge amounts of money in building basic infrastructure in Tibet, investment that might be difficult to attract if Tibet were an independent country). As for protecting culture, if Tibet were an autonomous region not only in name but also in practice (as things stand now, autonomous regions in China tend to be under tighter and not looser control from the central government), then it might even be possible to permit a role for the Tibetan language in the political and business spheres, beyond the role it currently has in local government, which seems mostly to be in decorating non-essential signs.

When I got back to Wuhan and talked to Chinese friends there about my thoughts on Tibet, they laughed at my suggestion that Tibet and the rest of China need political freedom, and they told me “that will never happen”. The trend during my two years in China certainly seemed to be in the wrong direction; James Fallows noted in his blog the irony that just as the US was leaving it’s Bush era, China was entering its own — he was referring to international relations, but I think this applies more broadly to the Chinese government’s hard-line approach of the past few years. I don’t know what I, as a foreigner, could, or should do to make a difference – foreign meddling in Tibet in the past has only made things worse. Talking about the issues at stake is important, and I can do so more freely than Chinese friends can and certainly more freely than Tibetans can, but even this blog would be blocked in an instant if it began to get enough of a following to make a difference.

And so, it’s complicated. I don’t think the issue at stake in Tibet is one that’s fundamentally different from the issue at stake in the rest of China — at heart, it’s a question of protecting the rights of those who are politically and economically weak everywhere in China — but the repression in Tibet (and Xinjiang) seem more extreme than in other parts of China, maybe because those two regions have an added racial and religious dimension that make the difference between those with and without power even more blatant, and so the whole situation is more urgent. China is by no means unique in having this type of issue in its history — the way in which the US annexed its western regions and its treatment in the past of Native Americans, and past British treatment of Ireland and the Irish, are just two examples of issues that are today seen as shameful aspects of these countries pasts — but the fact that other countries have committed similar crimes in the past is no excuse for a country to continue committing those types of crimes today, as difficult as finding a solution may be (as the US has painfully learned in its attempts to make things up to the Native American population). For now, visiting Tibet is a mixed experience — like so many other places in China, it’s a beautiful and fascinating place, and it’s easy to ignore the problems that are there, but they’re very clearly still there, under the surface.

Further reading:

For those of you who would like to read more, I like Peter French’s book Tibet, Tibet. It’s billed as “a personal history of Tibet”; French was active in the Free Tibet movement, but later became disillusioned with the movement because of its failure in contributing to any kind of progress in political freedom in Tibet, and so he travels to Tibet to research his book and understand the different sides in the debate. Abrahm Lustgarten’s China’s Great Train is an interesting account of the building of the railway line into Tibet, although some simple mistakes and an obvious sympathy for the Tibetan independence movement undermine the author’s credibility. A professor of Chinese history who we met at the airport on our way out of Lhasa also recommended Dragon in the Land of Snows as a good account of the events the past few decades.

Lhasa

Lhasa is full of colors, chongcao and soldiers. It has the feel of a frontier town, with locals trying to preserve a disappearing way of life mixed in with outsiders hoping to strike gold (or, more precisely, iron and other minerals needed to feed factories on the mainland). My favorite description is Tony’s, who likens Lhasa to Arizona: “dry, sunny, animal skulls as ornamentation, and armed police checking your papers if you happen to look different.”

The last few weeks of travelling have left me behind on blog updates; more thoughts on Tibet to follow soon.

Yak butter

On the roof of the Jokhang Temple

Painted box

Door in Lhasa

Spices

Selling chongcao